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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 3(a) Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

The court committed error in granting summary judgment to

Defendant, and denying it on liability to Plaintiff, when the law applied
to the case facts is one of clear liability of host to business invitee who
was injured solely by a fixed and unsafe condition installed and
controlled by Defendant.
STANDARD OF REVIEW. The standard of review for summary
Judgment is to view the facts favorably to the adverse party and to give
no deference to the trial court. Winegar v. Foraerer Corp., 813 P2d 104
(Utah 1991) A party to a summary judgment proceeding who admits,
or fails to deny, key facts is subject to adverse summary judgment.
Heqlar Ranch. Inc. v. Stillman. 619 P2d 1390 (Utah 1980)

5

Preserved Record: Docketing Statement.

Plaintiff's Answer to

Defendant's motion (R. 204, 237).
2. Whether Plaintiff is entitled to fees and costs for defense of
either or both of defense summary judgment motions. The first defense
was that the wind was so strong that it constituted an act of god for
which Defendant was not liable.(R 19) That failed as there was no
evidence in support, but caused Plaintiff six months delay in trial
proceedings. Defendant's second motion misquoted law on which the
trial court relied in granting summary judgment.(R 91)
STANDARD OF REVIEW. The determination of whether Rule 11,
U.R.C.P., has been violated is made on an objective basis. Giffen v.
R.W.L 913 P2d 761 (Utah App. 1996)
Preserved Record: Plaintiff's Docketing Statement. Plaintiff's Motion
For Fees (R.237).

6

DETERMINATIVE RULES
Rule 56. U.R.C.P. Summary Judgment.
"(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim
counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at
any time after the expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the
action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse
party, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary
judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof.
(b) For defending party.

A party against whom a claim,

counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is
sought, may, at any time, move with or without supporting affidavits for
a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any party thereof.
(c) Motion for proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served
at least ten days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse
party prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith the pleadings, depositions,
7

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered
on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as the
amount of damages."

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a personal injury case. It is a slip and fall case.
It is about a patient going to see her doctor at Cottonwood Hospital
and falling at the entry to the hospital's main, north, entry because of a
mat placed there by the hospital to protect against bad weather by being
intended to keep invitees from slipping or carrying water on their shoes
into the hospital. She fell because the mat lifted up and hit her lower
legs causing her to fall. The mat flipped because the wind was blowing.
IHC had the exterior mat in place for six years and had never checked
8

it to see if it was safe in bad weather. No third person nor negligence
by the guest, plaintiff, is involved.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
IHC made a motion for summary judgment. (Addendum 2)
Plaintiff made a similar motion for summary judgment on the issue of
liability. The court, Judge Iwasaki, granted IHC's motion, denied
plaintiffs motion and granted summary judgement in favor IHC,
dismissing Plaintiff's claim in its entirety with prejudice. (Addendum
1)

NATURE AND DATE OF ORDERS APPEALED FROM:
Order granting defendant's summary judgment motion and
denying plaintiffs - January 31,1997.
DATE OF FILING NOTICE OF APPEAL:
Monday, March 3,1997. (February had 28 days. The 30th day,
March 2, was a Sunday)

9

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts are in basic agreement. It is factually a simple case.
At 11:00 a.m. on March 13,1995, Plaintiff (Cathy) was going to the
Cottonwood Hospital, Murray, Utah to see her attending physician for
treatment of her multiple sclerosis and bad back. As Cathy approached
the main, north, door of the hospital, she walked onto a flat exterior
entry mat outside the hospital's front door. It was a windy day. While
she was on the mat, it lifted and flapped in the wind, striking her shins.
It and her forward motion caused her to fall forward onto her knees, then
onto her hands which she had put out to break her fall. She is 47 years
old.

She had walked with difficulty due to her M.S., but without

mechanical aides. Due to her M.S., Cathy did not heal properly, has
major permanent impairment of her knees and wrists as a result, and
needs canes attaching to her forearms to walk. The injury to her wrists
has kept her from her previous work as a computer maven because she
can no longer use her wrists properly. (R179)
10

The mat was six years old. It was purchased by Idella Warren who
was in charge of housekeeping for I.H.C's Cottonwood Hospital. Mrs.
Warren testified in her deposition that she looked at several mats before
buying the subject 3M mat. The purpose of the mat, she said, was to
keep people entering the hospital from slipping at the entryway and to
dry their feet so there wouldn't be water on the hospital's interior floor.
That is, the mat was intended for use in adverse weather. She said that
before she purchased the mat, the 3M salesman put it down in the
entryway and set up a powerful fan to demonstrate. The mat, which was
heavy then, did not lift or flap when the fan was turned on. (R160 -166)
Gregory Burr and his sister-in-law, Tamera Parker, were standing
at the hospital's entryway and saw Cathy fall. They were taking an
outdoor break as they were visiting Tamera's father who had just had
heart surgery. They both saw the mat lift, strike Cathy and cause her
to fall. Mr. Burr said that he had watched Cathy walking up, had noticed
that she was walking slowly and with difficulty, so when she fell he went
11

to her and offered to help her up. She replied that she has M.S. and
was hurt, so he notified the hospital and they brought out a wheelchair
and took her in to emergency.

Mr. Burr and Ms. Parker said it was a

windy day, but there was no particularly powerful gust of wind at the time
Cathy fell. (R173 -178 for Parker, 167-172 for Burr)
About two hours later, Richard Stout, the hospital's chief security
man, came out and saw the witnesses when they were again taking an
outdoor break. They told Mr. Stout what had happened. While he was
there, the wind was still blowing, and lifted the mat again. Mr. Burr
pointed this out to Mr. Stout who flattened the mat with his foot.
In his deposition Mr. Stout said the day was windy, but not
remarkably so.(R 147 -152)
Idella Warren and Ann Anderson, who were in charge of safety at
the hospital, came out and looked at the mat. They both observed that
it had become light and limber and was obviously unsafe in wind, so
they had the mat picked up and placed it sideways just outside the front
12

door of the hospital and had heavy planters put on its ends so that it
would not flap again.(R 153-159 for Anderson, 160-166 for Warren)
Defendant has acknowledged the accuracy of the facts as stated
above, except that Mr. Stout denies recalling seeing the mat flap while
he spoke to Mr. Burr, and the extent of Cathy's injuries is not conceded.
The hospital's three witnesses maintain that the safety of hospital
guests was a very high priority, so the hospital regularly inspected the
hospital and its grounds to be sure they were safe. Ms. Warren and Ms.
Anderson conceded however, that they never considered whether the
mat might become light and limber before it wore out, so the mat was
never inspected for safety in inclement weather.

They apparently

assumed that because the salesman told them the mat would last 10
years it would be safe for ten years. (R I63, Depo.P 13, L. 5 - P. 14, L
22) Material wears out, whether it be fabric or rubber tires. The mat
was both being a rubberized fabric.

13

IHC is a major institution with hospitals in several states.
Presumably there are people on its staff who know mats should be
checked to see if wear has made them light, flexible and unsafe in bad
weather. This information was not shared with its Cottonwood branch.
As a result, no one at Cottonwood ever thought to wonder if the mat
might be unsafe.

As the mat had become unwindworthy before it

trapped Cathy, a safety check would have taken the mat out of service
earlier, so she never would have been hurt
Plaintiff produced no evidence that Defendant had actual
knowledge the mat was unsafe. It appears that IHC's failure to think
about the mat in terms of safety kept it ignorant of the actual hazard
posed by the mat in windy weather.
FACTS FOUND BY TRIAL COURT
Judge Iwasaki's order granting Defendant summary judgment and
denying Plaintiffs motions for summary judgment and fees, dated
January 31, 1997, states as findings of fact as follows (Addendum 1):
14

"For purposes of this motion, the court has resolved
doubts concerning questions of fact in favor of plaintiff and
has therefore assumed that plaintiff was injured when a mat
on defendant's property flipped in the wind and caused her
to fall. The court further assumes that the mat flipping in the
wind was an unsafe condition.
Based on the record presented, the court finds as
follows:
1.

The instrument causing plaintiff to fall, a mat

flipping in the wind, was a condition of a temporary nature
arising from the weather;
2.

There is no dispute of fact as to whether

defendant had notice that the mat had or would flip in the
wind, as all of the evidence presented to the court shows that
defendant had no notice that the mat had ever previously
flipped in the wind;
15

3.

The evidence as to the age of the mat, testing

performed at the time the mat was purchased, and the
regular inspections of the premises conducted by defendant,
shows, without dispute, that defendant did not have
constructive knowledge that the mat had or would flip in the
wind and create an unsafe condition.
WHEREFORE, based on the Findings set forth herein
and other good cause shown, Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment is granted, Plaintiff's Motion to Set
Aside Summary Judgment and Grant Her Motions is denied,
and Plaintiffs request for award of attorney fees is denied.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs claim against
IHC Health Services, Inc. (formerly IHC Hospitals, Inc.) and
Cottonwood Hospital Medical Center is dismissed with
prejudice." (Emphasis added)

16

STATEMENT OF FACTS RELATING TO LITIGATION
Defendant was served in July 1995.

In November 1995,

Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment stating that the wind
was so strong that "Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of
law under the Act of God doctrine."(R. 19-27)
There had been no such wind.
In support of the motion, Defendant submitted no statement as to
the wind's strength from any of the hospital's personnel, Mr. Stout, Ms.
Warren, Ms. Anderson, nor any meteorologist.
Judge Iwasaki denied the motion because it was spurious-there
was no wind strong enough to begin to constitute an act of God. (R.101103).
Plaintiff quoted Mr. Stout, the security chief, as follows;
"Q

Did they ([sic] Parker and Burr) tell you anything

at all about the strength of the wind?
A

No.
17

Q Did you notice anything yourself when you were out
in front talking to them about the strength of the wind?
A

It was windy. I — I couldn't — I couldn't testify of

wind mileage. It was windy. That's all I can say.
Q

You seem to be putting this in common

experience: It was a windy day.
A

Yeah.

Q

No special adjectives like 'the windiest day you'd

ever seen in your life'?
A

No. It was windy." (R 148, L14-L25)

With its own witness denying excessive wind, Defendant had no
basis for its Act of God motion.
If nothing else, Plaintiff should receive fees for defense of the
motion which took half a year, to Cathy's detriment, from first filing to
ruling.

18

After Judge Iwasaki denied Defendant's Motion to Dismiss based
on Act of God, defense then submitted a new motion, (Addendum 2)
stating two wrong arguments of law.
These were:
1)

Wind is a "temporary condition."

2)

The the host has liability for a fixed condition created by it
that causes harm only if the host had notice that the
condition was unsafe.

Both arguments are contrary to law (see Argument following), but
Judge Iwasaki followed them as shown in his order (Addendum 2).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Defendant,
and in denying summary judgment on the issue of liability to Plaintiff
because:

(1) As to Plaintiff, neither facts nor law supported the

summary judgment against her and (2) As to Defendant, its conduct and
19

lack of defenses justified summary judgment on the issue of liability
against it.
As to fees and costs, Defendant first filed a totally unfounded
summary judgment motion based on the wind being so strong as to
constitute an Act of God and therefore a defense for Defendant. The
trial court dismissed that.
The motion for summary judgment granted Defendant by the trial
court was based on its incorrect arguments of law which were not
based on an objective analysis of the law, yet were accepted by the trial
court.
Plaintiff seeks fees and costs for defense of either or both
arguments.
ARGUMENT
POINT 1
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY
DISPOSITION BECAUSE JUDGE IWASAKI
COMMITTED MANIFEST ERROR WHEN HE
20

APPLIED CLASS 1 LAW TO A CLASS 2 CASE
IN HOLDING NOTICE IS A CONDITION
PRECEDENT TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
LIABILITY WHEN THE HARM IS CAUSED BY A
FIXED CONDITION CREATED BY THE HOST.
Utah law for a long time has been very consistent in its treatment
of slip and fall cases. This law is well summarized in Allen v. Federated
Dairy Farms. P.2d 175 (Utah 1975) which states:
"...it is appropriate to observe that these slip - and - fall
cases have usually been regarded as falling into either one
or the other of two different classes.

The first (class)

involved some unsafe condition of a temporary nature, such
as a slippery substance on the floor and usually when it is
not known how it got there. In this class of cases, it is quite
universally held fault cannot be imputed to the Defendant so
that liability results therefrom unless two conditions are met:
(A) That he had knowledge of the condition, that is, either
actual knowledge, or constructive knowledge because the
21

condition existed long enough that he should have
discovered it; and (B) that after such knowledge, sufficient
time elapsed that if he exercised reasonable care he should
have remedied it.
"The second class of cases involves some unsafe condition
of a permanent nature, such as in the structure of a building,
or of a stairway, etc. or in equipment or machinery, or in the
manner of use, which was created or chosen by the
Defendant (or his agents), or for which he is responsible. In
such circumstances, where Defendant either created the
condition, or is responsible for it. he is deemed to know of
the condition; and no further proof of notice is necessary.
(Emphasis added)
The case of Durborow is clearly of the second class where
negligence is based on a showing that the owner is responsible for the
mat.
22

In that event the owner "is deemed to know of the condition; and
no further proof of notice is necessary."
Accord Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets, 918 P.2d 476 (Utah
1996); Koer v. Mavfair Markets, 19 Utah 2d. 339, 431 P.2d 566 (Utah
1967); Canfield v. Albertsons, Inc., 841 P.2d 1224 (Utah Ct. App. 1992);
Silcox v. Skaggs, 814 P.2d 623 (Utah 1991); Taylor v. Keith O'Brien,
537 P.2d 1022 (Utah 1975); Long v. Smiths Stores. 531 P.2d 360 (Utah
1973); DeWeese v. J.C. Penney Co.. 297 P.2d 898 (Utah 1956). Lopez
v. Union Pacific Railroad, 932 P2d 601 (Utah I997).
Squarely on point is Canfield v. Albertsons, Inc. supra, as the trial
court there made exactly the same error as Judge Iwasaki made here.
In Canfield, a lady slipped on a loose piece of lettuce, but Plaintiff had
introduced evidence that Albertsons had display boxes with lettuce set
up so that loose leaves could be expected. The trial court granted
summary judgment on the basis that Albertsons didn't have notice of
the particular loose piece of lettuce. The Court cited the cases cited
23

above, such as Koer and Allen, made the same review of the two
classes of the cases as in Allen. (841 P.2d at 1226) and stated:
"It is here that the trial court has misinterpreted the law by
applying the analysis governing the first theory, rather than
the analysis governing the second theory, which is the theory
at issue... An injured party need not prove either actual or
constructive knowledge of the specific condition. Id. at 901.
In this type of case notice is satisfied as a matter of law
because the store owner is deemed to be informed of the
dangerous condition since it adopted the method of
operation.

To relieve the plaintiff of the requirement of

proving actual or constructive notice in such instances, is to
effect a more equitable balance in regard to the burden of
proof... It was reasonably foreseeable that under this method
of operation some leaves would fall or be dropped on the
floor by customers thereby creating a dangerous condition.
24

Because Albertsons chose this method of operation, the
question of whether Albertsons had notice, either actual or
constructive, is not relevant.

The relevant question is

whether Albertsons took reasonable precautions to protect
customers against the dangerous condition it created."
(Canfieldat1226. 1227)
Applying the Canfield rationale to the case at bar, as the hospital
has admitted that in the six years that the mat was down in continuous
outdoor use in all weather that it never once inspected the mat for
safety. Had it done so, it would have seen the mat had become so light
as to be unsafe, and as such obviously did not happen for the first time
on the day of Plaintiffs fall, Defendant breached its duty of care.
Under the law of Utah, if a host creates a condition which causes
the injury, there is no requirement that the host have notice that the
condition is unsafe. It is imputed as a matter of law.
25

Judge Iwasaki states that Plaintiff was injured by a mat placed by
Defendant, flipping in wind and striking her.
This Finding of Fact is absolutely a Class 2 category, yet Judge
Iwasaki goes on to dismiss Plaintiff's case because bad weather is a
temporary condition and she hasn't established that the hospital had
notice. (Addendum 1)
This is manifest error of law justifying immediate reversal.
Due to Defendant's motion, Plaintiff who was badly injured, has
been delayed two years now. Lacking those motions, this case would
have been brought to a head before now and, as there is no basis to
find comparative negligence on Plaintiffs part, she would have received
some award to help her deal with her injuries.
Complicating factors found in other cases are absent here making
this a very simple case:
(1) There is no third party who might have caused the hazard,
such as "who dropped the lettuce leaf."
26

(2) There is no question that the condition created by the host
was unsafe, as Judge Iwasaki so found.
(3) There is no question of contributory negligence by
Plaintiff. The mat lay flat and was safe when she walked on it. When
it flapped while she was on it, she was trapped. She was hurt by a
hazard she could not detect by any reasonable human vigilance.
This is not a slip and fall case. It is a hit and fall case.
(4) There is no question that IHC can claim its used
reasonable efforts to find and correct the hazard.
Having purchased the mat six years before, and having been told
verbally by the salesman it should last about ten years before it wore
out, the hospital never once inspected it during bad weather to see if it
was still heavy and stiff as when it was purchased, or whether it had
since become light and limber, i.e., unsafe in the very weather for which
it was purchased.
27

The mat was a rubberized fabric. Fabric and rubber both inevitably
wear out. A rubber tire, for example, will blow out if driven long enough.
That is why the prudent driver inspects it regularly for tread wear so he
can replace it before it become dangerous.
As IHC is a large entity with hospitals in several states, it is
probable that personnel somewhere in IHC knew to check mats. This
information was not passed on to its Cottonwood Hospital personnel.
Judge Iwasaki found Defendant had neither actual nor constructive
notice. Plaintiff concedes Defendant had no actual notice
What about Defendant's constructive notice?
Constructive notice is defined in the above cited cases, such as
Allen, Supra, which states as to constructive notice that if a condition
existed long enough that the host should have discovered it in the
exercise of reasonable care, then the host would have constructive
notice.
28

Under Rule 60, U.R.C.P., open issues of material fact preclude
summary judgment.
In view of the fact that the mat had been unsafe for some time
before Plaintiff fell, and the sole reason the unsafeness was not
discovered was that Defendant never inspected the mat, there is at
least an open issue of fact that Defendant had constructive notice, not
because it had actual notice, but because "the condition existed long
enough that they should have discovered it" (Allen).
In accord on constructive notice are Pollari v. Salt Lake City, 176
P2d 111 (Utah 1947). Lasanga v. McCarthy. 177 Pacific 2nd 734 (Utah
1947).

Basin Loans Inc., v. Young, (Utah App. 1988) (defines

constructive notice as "a legal inference or presumption by which, for
promotion of sound policy or purpose, the legal rights and interests of
parties are treated as though they had actual notice or knowledge") Bute
v. Union Pac. R. Co.. 232 P2d 332 (Utah 1951).
29

This section on constructive notice is included because of Judge
Iwasaki's specific finding that Defendant lacked it.
The error in that finding is demonstrated here, both to straighten
out the fact situation and also to bolster Plaintiff's argument for fees
(Argument Point 3). In point of fact and law because this is a case
where knowledge is imputed to the host as a matter of law regardless
of whether it had actual or constructive notice, this simply clears the
concept from the discussion.
Going now to the other error urged on Judge Iwasaki by Defendant
in its summary judgment motion, that wind is temporary condition
comparable to the spilled drink on the store floor, so the hospital had no
duty until it had notice of the hazard and, lacking notice, was free of
fault, this too is bad law.
De Weese v. Pennevs, Supra, deals in effect with whether the
weather is a temporary condition.
30

In De Weese, Penneys at its 200 South and Main location, had an
exterior terrazzo entryway.

During good weather, it provided good

footing and was very attractive. However, in bad weather it became
slick. To deal with this, Penneys had mats it put out then.
Mrs. DeWeese slipped because the terrazzo was wet and the mats
weren't out. Although old, Deweese is a solidly reasoned case. Mrs.
DeWeese said it had been snowing for some time. Penneys said it
hadn't been snowing long enough for it to have notice or it would have
put the mats out. The jury verdict for plaintiff was affirmed on appeal.
Snow, too, can be considered a temporary condition. After all we have
more windy than snowy days. Such a concept wasn't even considered
as a defense. Slickness in bad weather made Penneys liable unless it
could show it had met its duty of care. That was held to be a jury
question.

31

DeWeese stands for the proposition that bad weather is not a
temporary condition defense when the very item used by management
was intended for such weather.
ARGUMENT
POINT 2
PLAINTIFF HAS ESTABLISHED A PRIMA FACIE
CASE TO WHICH DEFENDANT, UNDER THE FACTS,
HAS NO DEFENSE, SO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON LIABILITY SHOULD
HAVE BEEN GRANTED, AND JUDGE IWASAKI'S
ORDER DENYING HER SUCH JUDGMENT SHOULD
BE REVERSED.
When a guest establishes that their injury is due to the unsafeness
of an item, such as the mat here, put in place and controlled by the
host, the Plaintiff has then established a prima facie case of negligence
on the part of the host. Lopez v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 932 P2d
601 (Utah 1997)
"In cases such as the present one which involve a loose
object causing one to fall, it is important to distinguish
32

between the situation when the object causing the injury was
placed on the floor by the employer-store or its employee, or
placed there by some third person. If it is established that
the object causing the injury was placed there by the former,
or that they were aware of its presence, a prima facie case
for the jury is established on the issue of negligence. Koer
v. Mavfair Markets, supra.
As Judge Iwasaki found, and the hospital concedes, the Plaintiff's
injury was caused by a mat that was unsafe in bad weather as shown
by its flapping in the wind and causing Plaintiff to fall, Plaintiff has, as a
matter of law, established a prima facie case.
A prima facie case entitles one to judgment unless opposing
evidence is put in to rebut the presumption.
In the case at bar, Defendant's rebuttal relates only to lack of
notice, that it wasn't aware until Plaintiff fell that its mat had become
unsafe. Notice being imputed as a matter of law, (Point 1 supra),
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whether Defendant had notice or not is irrelevant.

Defendant has

admitted that it never thought to examine the mat for safety in bad
weather during the six years it was in place, but only looked at the mat
in connection with its general inspection of the premises for safety. This
conduct fails to meet the duty of reasonable care placed on the host by
Utah law. Indeed it is at essence an argument that ignorance of the
host, caused by never considering safety, is a defense. If adopted as
law it would destroy any duty to use care.
As defendant has admitted it did not inspect, and that is its legal
duty, summary judgment should be entered against it. Heglar Ranch
Inc., v. Stillman, 619 P2d 390 (Utah I980)
Accordingly, Plaintiff submits she is entitled to an order finding
liability established and remanding the case for trial on damages.
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ARGUMENT
POINT 3
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER FEES
AND COSTS FOR THIS APPEAL AND FOR THE
MOTIONS BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT.
A review of the Utah cases reveals none where Plaintiff has a
stronger case of liability than in this one.
It is a fact of life that when major Defendants are sued in tort that
they have a practice of discouraging such claims by making them go
through protracted and expensive litigation.
Whether this observation is shared by the Court or not, it is clear
that in this case the hospital, having no defense, invented an ACT OF
GOD DEFENSE knowing that it had no facts to support such a motion.
See Statement of Facts Relating to Litigation, supra.
Having failed in that motion, the hospital then filed its second
summary judgment motion (Addendum 2) making the two arguments
that wind is a temporary condition and that the host has no liability
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unless it has knowledge that the condition it created will be unsafe in
wind.
A reading of Defendant's motion will show that it cited no case on
point for either of those propositions. To the contrary, the cases it cited
do not so hold.
Other Utah cases discuss the liability of the host in bad weather,
such as DeWeese v. J.C. Penney Company, Supra.
As an example in Dohertv v. California-Pacific Irrigation Company,
546 P.2d 880 a canal company was held liable for flooding of a home
near the canal even thought the flooding was cause by torrential rain on
the basis that it could have dealt with the effects of the rain and failed
to do so. This is a far stronger case for the defendant than Durborow,
yet the duty of care led to judgment against the irrigation company.
The claim that bad weather is a "temporary condition" is a per se
defense in no Utah case. It can be a factor if the bad weather is so
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recent or unexpected that the host exercised reasonable care and still
hasn't had the opportunity to respond to it. DeWeese Supra.
The effect of Defendant's two motions is to cause a two year delay
to a badly injured human being.
Rule 1, URCP provides that the purpose of the rules is to ensure
that civil litigation be handled in a manner that is "speedy, just, and
inexpensive."
Defendant's motions have effectively negated Rule 1.
Rule 11, URCP implements Rule 1. Rule 11 does so by requiring
that motions befiledonly on an objective basis, that the facts stated are
based on reasonable investigation, and law accurately stated as to
those facts. Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163 (Utah 1989).
Rimensburger v. Rimensburger, 841 P.2d 709 (Utah 1992). Giffen v.
R.W.L., 913 P2d 761 (Utah App. 1996).
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This appeal has been occasioned solely because Judge Iwasaki
accepted and followed the hospital's arguments which were wrong on
facts and wrong on law.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff asks the Court enter its order forthwith, returning this
matter to the trial Court on the basis of manifest error, such order to
include:
1. An order setting aside Judge Iwasaki's Summary Judgment for
Defendant.
2. Finding that Plaintiff has established, as a matter of fact and
law, negligence on the part of the hospital.
3. Finding Plaintiff is entitled to her fees and costs for the motions
before Judge Iwasaki and for this appeal.
Respectfully submitted.
DATED this 22 day of January, 1998

Q

AJftatot J,
David J Friel |
Attorney for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I hand carried two true and correct copies of
the foregoing document by U.S. mail, first class, postage paid pre-paid
on January Jfrh_, 1998 to:

Charles W. Dahlquist,
David Hardy
Attorneys for Defendant
KIRTON & McCONKIE
1800 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0120

D:Dur.l.
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Tabl

Charles W. Dahlquist, H (A0798)
David J. Hardy (A5963)
KIRTON & McCONKJJE
Attorneys for Defendant
COTTONWOOD HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER
1800 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 328-3600

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CATHERINE L. DURBOROW,
ORDER
Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 950905016PI

IHC HOSPITALS, INC., COTTONWOOD
HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER

Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki

Defendant.

This matter has came before the court on. the Motion for Summary Judgment of
defendant Cottonwood Hospital Medical Center. Defendant submitted memoranda in support
of the Motion and Plaintiff submitted memoranda opposing the Motion. In connection with her
opposition, plaintiff also filed a Counter Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. A hearing on
the Motion for Summary Judgment was held September 23, 1996, with Samuel King and

David J. Friel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff and David J. Hardy appearing on behalf of
defendant. At that hearing, plaintiff withdrew her Counter Motion.
Following the court's ruling in favor of defendant on the Motion for Summary
Judgment, plaintiff filed a Motion to Set Aside Summary Judgment and to Grant Her Motions.
Plaintiff and defendant filed memoranda in support of and opposing the Motion. A hearing on
this Motion was held on January 10, 1997, with Samuel King and David J. Friel appearing on
behalf of plaintiff and David J. Hardy on behalf of defendant.
For purposes of this motion, the court has resolved doubts concerning questions of fact
in favor of plaintiff and has therefore assumed that plaintiff was injured when a mat on
defendant's property flipped in the wind and caused her to fall. The court further assumes that
the mat flipping in the wind was an unsafe condition.
Based on the record presented, the court finds as follows:
1.

The instrument causing plaintiff to fall, a mat flipping in the wind, was a

condition of a temporary nature arising from the weather;
2.

There is no dispute of fact as to whether defendant had notice that the mat had

or would flip in the wind, as all of the evidence presented to the court shows that defendant
had no notice that the mat had ever previously flipped in the wind;
3.

The evidence as to the age of the mat, testing performed at the time the mat was

purchased, and the regular inspections of the premises conducted by defendant, shows, without
dispute, that defendant did not have constructive knowledge that the mat had or would flip in
the wind and create an unsafe condition.
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WHEREFORE, based on the findings set forth herein and other good cause shown, the
Motion for Summary Judgment is granted, Plaintiffs Motion to Set Aside Summary Judgment
and Grant Her Motions is denied, and Plaintiffs request for an award of attorney fees is
denied.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs claims against IHC Health Services, Inc.
(formerly IHC Hospitals, Inc.) and Cottonwood Hospital Medical Center are dismissed with
prejudice.

DATED this 7 y

day of January, 1997.
BY THE COURT:

/£
Gfenn K. Iwasaki, District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the /£

day of January, 1997, I served the foregoing ORDER

by depositing the same in First Class United States Mail, Postage Prepaid, addressed to the
following:
Samuel King
David Friel
989 East 900 South, Suite A-l
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105

Mil
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Tab 2

Charles W. Dahlquist (A0798)
Randy T. Austin (A6171)
KIRTON & McCONKIE
Attorneys for Defendant
IHC Hospitals, Inc.
Cottonwood Hospital Medical Center
1800 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1004
Telephone: (801) 328-3600

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CATHERINE L. DURBOROW,
Plaintiff,
vs.
IHC HOSPITALS INC.
COTTONWOOD HOSPITAL
MEDICAL CENTER
Defendant(s).

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
Civil No. 95090501PI
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki

:

Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Defendants
Intermountain Healthcare, Inc. and Cottonwood Hospital hereby move the Court for
summary judgment in the above-entitled matter. The motion is brought because the
Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law under the Act of God doctrine.

The Motion is supported by the Affidavits of Tamara Parker, Gregory Burr, and Ann
Anderson and the Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment submitted herewith.
DATED this

7 -

day of November, 1995.
KIRTON & McCONKIE

'^\(puJy
."V
Chaifies W/ Dahiqiuist
P^anoy T. Austin (
Attorneys for Defendant IHC Hospitals, Inc.
and Cottonwood Hospital Medical Center

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this £?'

day of November, 1995, I caused a true and

correct copy of the foregoing to be mailed through United States mail, postage prepaid,
to the following:
• ' » •

David B. Erickson, Esq.
INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE, INC.
36 South State Street, 22nd Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Samuel King, Esq.
KING, FRIEL & COLTON
2120 South 1300 East, No. 301
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
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Charles W. Dahlquist (A0798)
Randy T. Austin (A6171)
KIRTON & McCONKIE
Attorneys for Defendant
IHC Hospitals, Inc.
Cottonwood Hospital Medical Center
1800 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1004
Telephone: (801) 328-3600

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH
CATHERINE L. DURBOROW.
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

vs.

IHC HOSPITALS INC.,
COTTONWOOD HOSPITAL
MEDICAL CENTER, et al,

Civil No. 95090501PI
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki

Defendant(s).

Defendants Intermountain Healthcare, Inc. and Cottonwood Hospital submit the
following Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of their Motion for
Summary Judgment.

UNDISPUTED FACTS
1.

Plaintiff fell at the entrance to Cottonwood Hospital on March 13, 1995 at

approximately 11:15 a.m. See Complaint, at If 2.
2.

Tne fail was caused "by a mat at the entry to the hospital lifting due to

wind, causing Plaintiff to fall." See id.
3.

The ma: at issue is a heavy mat, designed specifically to be used at the

entrance to buildings. See Affidavit of Ann Anderson, at U 4-6.
4.

The wind on March 13, 1995 was strong, and the gust which lifted the mat

allegedly causing Plaintiffs fall was an exceptionally strong gust. See Affidavit of Tamara
Parker ("Parker Affidavit"), at U1J 4-6; Affidavit of Gregory Burr ("Burr Affidavit"), at UU
4-6.
5.

Cottonwood Hospital has received no other reports of winds lifting the mat

in question either before or after Plaintiffs fall. See Anderson Affidavit, at U 4.

ARGUMENT
I. Summary Judgment Is Appropriate in This Case
Summary judgment must be granted when there is no genuine issue of material
fact, and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. See Rule 56
U.R.C.P. Courts have ruled specifically that when an accident is the result of "an act of
God," summary judgment is appropriate. See Rock}} Mountain Thrift Stores, Inc. v. Salt
n

Lake City Corp., 887 P.2d 848. 852 (Utah 1994); Grote v. Franklin, 573 N.E.2d 360 (111.
App. Ct. 1991); Golden v. Amory, 109 N.E. 2d 131 (Mass. 1952); md Benavides v.
Gonzalez, 396 S.W.2d 512, 514 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) (all affirming grants of summary
judgment based on an act of God). Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court has cited with
approval language from a decision rendered by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts,
stating thai if an accident is the result of an act of God, a defendant is not negligent, as a
matter of law, "even if some other action than that taken by the [defendant] would have
been better.'1 Rocky Mountain, 887 P.2d at 852.

II. The Accident at Issue Here Was Caused bv an Act of God
More importantly for purposes of this case, the Utah Supreme Court has
unequivocally declared that "unusual and unexpected high wind[s] . . . are not reasonably
foreseeable and . . . the standard of duty imposed by the law does not require one to
guard against [them]." Hanks v. Christensen, 354 P.2d 564, 567 (Utah 1960). The court
recently reaffirmed the rationale of the Hanks case in Rocky Mountain. There, the Utah
Supreme Court declared that defendants "cannot be charged with a duty of care to
protect all persons from injury caused by extraordinary acts of nature . . . ." Id. at 852.
The court stated that M[w]hen such events occur, individuals must themselves shoulder
their losses." Id. Here, it is clear that the alleged accident was caused by an act of God,
and the court should, therefore, grant summary judgment..
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To be considered an act of God, an event or occurrence must not be reasonably
foreseeable. Dougherty v. California-Pacific Utilities Co., 546 P.2d 880, 882 (Utah 1976);
Widmyer v. Southeast Skyways, Inc., 584 P.2d 1, 14 (Alaska 1978). In the Hanks case the
coun held that this standard requires the establishment, in the case of high winds, that the
wind be unusual and unexpected. Here, the winds that allegedly caused the accident were
undeniably "unusual and unexpected" and the incident was unforeseeable as a matter of
law.
Plaintiff admits that her fall was caused "by a mat at the entry to the hospital
lifting due to wind." See Complaint, U 2. Thus, there is no dispute that the wind caused
this accident. The onlv auestion is whether the wind was unusual and unexpected, and
the affidavits clearly establish that it was. Eye witnesses testified that the wind that lifted
the mat in this case was an unusually strong gust of wind. See Parker Affidavit at UH 4-6;
Burr Affidavit, at UH 4-6. Moreover, Defendant has clearly established that no similar
incidents have occurred or been reported before or after the accident at Cottonwood
Hospital, and therefore, this incident was not reasonably foreseeable, as a matter of law.
See Anderson Affidavit U 4. Thus, it is clear that the wind at issue here was unusual and
unexpected and that it could not have been foreseen. To hold otherwise is to impose on
the Defendant the duty to guard against "unusually high and unexpected winds" which the
Hanks court held was contrary to law. Accordingly, the court should grant Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment.
4

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Defendants respectfully request that the Court grant
their Motion for Summary Judgment.
•*c-k

DATED this H ^>

dav of November. 1995.
KIRTON & McCONKIE

Charles/W). Dahi^nst /
Randy L . Austin/ ^*W
Attorneys for Defendants IHC Hospitals. Inc.
and Cottonwood Hospital Medical Center
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Charies W. Dahlquist (A0798)
Randv T. Austin (A6171)
KIRTON & McCONKTE
Attorneys for Defendant
IHC Hospitals, Inc.
Cottonwood Hospital Medical Center
1800 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Sal: Lake City, Utah 84111-1004
Telephone: (801) 328-3600

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CATHERINE L. DURBOROW,
AFFIDAVIT OF TAMARA PARKER
Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 950905016PI

IHC HOSPITALS INC.
COTTONWOOD HOSPITAL MEDICAL
CENTER

Judge Glen K. Iwasaki

Defendant(s).

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

:ss

Tamara Parker, being duly sworn, deposes and says:
1.

I am a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, over eighteen years of

age with personal knowledge of the facts set forth herein.

2.

I was at Cottonwood Hospital on March 13, 1995.

3.

I was outside the main entrance to Cottonwood Hospital when the Plaintiff

Catherine Durborow tripped and fell.
4.

Ms. Durborow fell when the mat placed at the entrance to the Hospital was

lifted up by an unusually strong wind.
.5.

The wind was blowing on March 13. 1995. and the gust which lifted the mat

was an unusually strong gust, even for thai day. It was one of the strongest gusts of wind
that I can ever remember feeling.
6.

I do not remember the mat lifting for other winds or gusts that day despite

the fact that other gusts were also strong.
7.

I know the foregoing to be true to the best of mv knowledge.

^\ aJ\"Y\g^a.

vow, XC

TAMARA PARKER
SUBSCRIBED .AND SWORN TO before me this \H

day of October, 1995.

team*,
NOTARY PUBLIC
/

1

/ ^ ^ ^ V

rf?f4§r&M«
vA^^PyW

L

JDAKCRrlO

I

60 Ess: South T*note.*t 805 f
SaftUfcaCUy.lftihMllI
*

J

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this & '

day of November, 199i, I caused a true and

correct copy of the foregoing to be mailed through United States mail, postage prepaid.
to the following:
David E. Erickson, ESQ.
INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE, INC.
36 South State Street, 22nd Floor
Sai: Lake City, Utah 84111
Samuel Kins. Esc.
KING. FRIEL & COLTON
2120 South 1300 East. No. 301
Sal: Lake City. Utah 84106
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Varies W. Dahiquist (A0798)
Randv T. Austin (A6171)
KIRfOK & McCONKIE
Attorneys for Defendant
IHC Hospitals. Inc.
Cottonwood Hospital Medical Center
1800 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Tempie
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111-10(K
Telephone: (801; 328-3600

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH
CATHERINE L. DURBOROW,
AFFIDAVIT OF GREGORY BURR
Plaintiff.
vs.

Civil No. 950905016PI

IHC HOSPITALS INC.
COTTONWOOD HOSPITAL xMEDICAL
CENTER

Judse Glen K. Iwasaki

Defendants).

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

:ss

Gregory Burr, being duly sworn, deposes and says:
1.

I am a resident of Salt Lake Count}, State of Utah, over eighteen years of

age with personal knowledge of the facts set forth herein.

2.

I was at Cottonwood Hospital on March 12. 1995.

3.

I was outside the main entrance to Cottonwood Hospital when the Plaintiff

Catherine Durborow tripped and fell.
4.

Ms. Durborow fell when the mat placed at the entrance to the Hospital was

lifted up by an unusually strong wind.
5.

The wind was blowing on March 13, 1995, and the gust which lifted the ma;

was an unusually sirong gust, even for that day. It was one of the strongest gusts of wind
that I can ever remember feeling.
6.

I know the foregoing to be true to the best of my knowledge.

L, IS
GREGORY BURR
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this \g

I ———« « .

NOTARY PUBLIC

NOTA "PUBLIC™" "I
JOANC.REID
I
60 East Soum Temple. #1800 I
Salt Lake City, UtaD 84111

day of October. 199:

K

My Commission Expires anX'SS |

/
'

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I herebv certify that on this

day of November. 1995, I caused a true and

correct copy of the foregoing to be mailed through United States mail, postage prepaid.
to the following:
David B. Erickson, ESQ.
INTBRMOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE. INC.
36 South State Street. 22nd Floor
Sal: Lake City, Utah 84111
Samuel King, Esq.
KING. FRIEL & COLTON
2120 South 1300 East. Nc. 301
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
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Charles W. Dahlquist (A0798)
Randv T. Austin (A6171)
KIRT ON & McCONKIE
Attorneys for Defendant
IHC Hospitals, Inc.
Cottonwood Hospital Medical Center
1800 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-100Telephone: (801) 328-3600

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH
CATHERINE L. DURBOROW
AFFIDAVIT OF ANN ANDERSON
Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 950905016PI

IHC HOSPITALS INC..
COTTONWOOD HOSPITAL
MEDICAL CENTER, et al.

Judge Glen K. Iwasaki

Defendant(s).
1.

I am a resident of Sal: Lake County, State of Utah, over eighteen years of

age with personal knowledge of the facts set forth herein.
2.

I am the Risk Management Director of Cottonwood Hospital.

3.

It is my responsibility under hospital policy to investigate all accidents and

reported hazards at Cottonwood Hospital.

4.

No resort has ever been made that the mat, which was allegedly lifted by

wind in this case, had eve: been lifted by wind before, nor has any similar incident been
reported since the alleged incident. Similar mats are used at other hospital entrances,
and no report of wind lifting any other such mat has ever been received by the hospital
nor has any hospital employee observed such an incident to the best of my knowledge.
5.

The mat a: issue is 4 fee: x 13 feet and weighs 60 pounds.

6.

The mat was being used at the entrance to the hospital as designed and

recommended by the manufacturer.
7.

I know the foregoing to be true to the best of my knowledge.

Ufa*,

^L^td^rTz/1

Ann Anderson

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this

awrySSL
STATE

RACWD\DURBOROV»^FFlDAVlANN

I
,

-•rt
/

/

/^^
4C
Notarv/Public

/

ciav of November. 1995.
, .- .. >

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this

^r*

day 01 November, 1992, I caused a true and

correct copy of the foregoing to be mailed through United States mail, postage prepaid,
to the following:
David B. Erickson. Esq.
INTERMOUNTALK HEALTH CARE, INC.
36 South State Street, 22nd Floor
Sal: Lake City, Utah 84111
Samuel King, Esc.
KING. FRIEL & COLTON
2120 South 1300 East. No. 301
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 84106
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